The weapon of Peace 



TEN 

CENTS 


BY 

Samuel Wesley Long 


“ The next thing is to think 
long and think hard as to 
how, when this strife ends, 
a recurrence of such a cal¬ 
amity can be prevented.” 

—Viscount James Bryce 


—?v 












THE WEAPON OF 
PEACE 

BY 

SAMUEL WESLEY LONG 


Copyright, 1915 
by Samuel Wesley Long 



The Emery Press 
1206-1208 Race Street 
Philadelphia, Pa. 


Acknowledgment for certain 
statistical and historical facts 
is made to the following: 
Hon. Theodore E. Burton, an 
article/‘The Day of Internat¬ 
ional Peace,” Saturday Even¬ 
ing Post ; William I. Hull, 
Ph.D. “The Two Hague Con¬ 
ferences” ; Mr. Amos Pinchot, 
a pamphlet/* What’s the Mat¬ 
ter With America ? ” 

THE AUTHOR 



O./o 


JAN 18 1915 


©Q.A391369 



PREFACE 


^ any discussion of or plan for world-wide 
and permanent peace, one may start with 
the fundamental premise that civilized 
nations desire, above all other things, 
peace. Certainly this is true with reference 
to the people. With a few possible exceptions, 
it is also true of governments. 

The real problem of the preservation of peace 
is a question of means. This, in turn, is a matter 
of external force—moral in ordinary cases; phys¬ 
ical in extreme instances, though not necessarily 
destructive to life and property. 

The writer does not believe that the world has 
sufficiently advanced toward the Utopian goal to 
warrant the United States in scrapping its war¬ 
ships, dismantling its forts or ceasing to teach the 
art of war, rather, the stronger the means of 
national defense the more respect will be shown 
our leadership in bringing about the desired end. 

If The Weapon of Peace shall be nothing more 
than a guide post on the road to universal inter¬ 
national amity, the book needs no other justi¬ 
fication. 

It remains for the economist and statesman to 
devise methods for the practical application of 
the plan outlined. 

Samuel Wesley Long. 

Wilmington, Del., November i, 1914- 











/ 


















I 




















































































CHAPTER I 


Finding the Germ 


ET: 


a future date well may some com¬ 
mentator write: “The war of the 
world ended in 19 —. 

“Spent and wasted; exhausted in body 
and spirit, with that slow but ultimate 
and infallible perception of the mass as a 
whole, the remnants of the herd that 
had escaped the slaughter knew the truth 
—the whole truth. 

“The appalling carnage, the empty 
victory, the colossal debt, the crushing 
burden of taxation brought even the com¬ 
mon people to a frightful realization of the 
whole sordid affair. As usual, men saw 
in retrospect what they had not seen in 
prospect. The basic answer to the cause, 


6 


The Weapon of Peace 


progress and termination of the conflict 
was clear—selfishness, greed—in the tan¬ 
gible, the concrete, gold.” 

Let us get straight on this point—our 
writer is not dealing with the anterior or 
immediate causes of the great war, nor is 
he covering all the reasons why all the 
nations engaged entered the conflict, but 
the stated cause is fundamental in the last 
analysis. 

It is safe to say that in most wars—on 
one side or the other—the basic cause is 
desire, necessary or wanton, for gain. To 
use the figure, lust of gain is the fuel that 
feeds the flames of war regardless of what 
serves as the match to start the conflagra¬ 
tion. 

The solution of the problem of most war 
prevention will ultimately be found in the 
field of war’s greatest cause— ECO¬ 
NOMICS. 

Further, it might be well to state that 


The Weapon of Peace 


7 


the suggestions offered throughout this 
volume are not intended as a cure-all for 
every cause of war. On the other hand, if 
we accept the statement of Loria, the 
Italian economist, to the effect that out of 
286 wars, economic causes were responsible 
in 258 cases, having isolated the germ of 
the most frequent causes of conflict we 
may hope to destroy it or, at least, control 
it in great degree when we find it threat¬ 
eningly active in the body politic. 


CHAPTER II 


The Economic Waste of War 

OTWITHSTANDING the tremen¬ 
dous saving that would be effected 
in time of peace by the abandon¬ 
ment of all military preparation for pos¬ 
sible war, disarmament, for the present, 
is beyond practicability, even sanity, and 
while the beating of spears into plowshares 
may some day become general, prepara¬ 
tions for defensive contingency can safely 
be decreased only in proportion to the 
progress made in the discovery and devel¬ 
opment of substitute means for warfare. 

A telling argument, from an economic 
standpoint, against the waste of war is in 
the figures covering the cost of past wars; 
the preparations made for the present war 






The Weapon of Peace 


9 


by countries now engaged; the estimated 
cost of the prosecution of the conflict; the 
money spent and being spent for war prep¬ 
arations by nations not at present em¬ 
broiled. 

While markedly incomplete, the statis¬ 
tics that follow furnish food for profound 
thought. During 1911, England expended 
$341,820,000; Russia, $319,770,000; Ger¬ 
many, $318,446,000; France, $270,918,000. 
These sums were for the armies and navies 
of the countries named. At the beginning 
of 1914 the annual expenditures of the 
Powers for past and prospective wars was 
$2,500,000,000. The United States’ share 
was $535,000,000. At the breaking out of 
the war now being waged France was pay¬ 
ing something like $193,000,000 interest 
annually on a national debt of $6,286,435,- 
000. Russia’s burden was $4,507,071,000. 
The national debts—created largely or 
entirely by military expenditures—of other 


IO 


The Weapon of Peace 


countries were: Austria-Hungary, $3,612,- 
389,000; Germany, $3,500,000,000; Eng¬ 
land, $3,389,577,000; Italy, $2,614,183,000; 
Spain, $1,886,221,000; Japan, $1,325,198,- 
000; United States, $915,353,000. The 
interest on Europe's debts totalled more 
than $1,000,000,000 annually. 

Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Ex¬ 
chequer, estimates that the cost to England 
of one year of war will be $2,250,000,000. 
E. H. Gary, an American financier, figures 
that eighteen months of conflict will result 
in a property loss of $35,000,000,000 to the 
nations engaged. 

Such vast sums, stated in cold type, are 
quite as much beyond human comprehen¬ 
sion as the millions of miles distance to the 
stars, yet these figures represent but a 
fraction of the gross when the total in¬ 
cludes loss of commerce, agricultural and 
manufacturing production, etc. And 
what an irreparable loss in arts, useful and 


The Weapon of Peace 


ii 


fine; education, culture and all the other 
things that combine to advance civilization. 

But what are material and cultural 
losses to the broken hearts of millions of 
widowed women, orphaned children and 
bereft mothers! 

What is, perhaps, the strongest count in 
the indictment against war is the dispro¬ 
portionate and permanent loss suffered by 
its helpless and innocent victims. 

An authority estimates that the deaths 
due directly and indirectly to the present 
conflict will, in a year and a half, exceed 
4,000,000. 

If one traces war back to the dim begin¬ 
ning of history, among the high spots of 
death on the battlefield, or due to attendant 
causes in modern times, will be found a 
ghastly record of 14,000,000 during the 
nineteenth century, 6,000,000 in the Napo¬ 
leonic Wars, while the appalling total in 
all wars to date is 15,000,000,000. 


CHAPTER III 


A Century of Peace Efforts 

ODERN organized effort to prevent 
war dates back more than a century, 
being born of the twenty-six-year 
travail of the Napoleonic Wars into which 
the United States was drawn in 1812. 

At the close of the Anglo-American 
struggle a peace society was formed in 
New York City, and from this beginning 
a number of similar organizations grew up 
throughout the country. 

Later, international peace conferences 
were held in a number of European capitals. 
The more important of these early meet¬ 
ings were the ones convened as follows: 
London, 1843; Brussels, 1848; Paris, 1849; 
Frankfort, 1850; London, 1851. Subse- 





The Weapon of Peace 


13 


quently, other congresses met in Paris, 
London, Rome, Berne, Chicago, Antwerp, 
Buda-Pesth, Hamburg, Paris, Glasgow, 
Monaco, Rouen, Boston, Lucerne, Milan 
and Munich. 

These congresses, in great part, had 
shaped international public opinion to a 
degree that brought encouraging response 
to the “Rescript” issued by Nicholas II, 
Czar of Russia, in August, 1898. This 
document deplored the great increase in 
armaments with its attendant burden of 
taxation, and suggested that some move 
be made toward limiting their growth in 
the future. It also suggested that the 
governments of the world name delegates 
to a conference to discuss “this grave 
problem.” 

On January 11, 1899 (Russian Calendar, 
December 30, 1898), a circular was issued 
giving an outline of subjects to be consid¬ 
ered by the conference, and on May 18, 


14 


The Weapon of Peace 


1899, the first Hague Conference was con¬ 
vened. 

So far as the stated purpose—to limit 
armaments—was concerned, the Confer¬ 
ence can hardly be described as a success. 

The most important result in the interest 
of peace was the organization of a Perma¬ 
nent Court of Arbitration. 

The Second Hague Conference was held 
in 1907 and furthered the work begun in 
1899. 

The two Hague Conferences were with¬ 
out doubt the greatest steps taken in the 
promotion of international peace, and the 
importance of this means of settling inter¬ 
national questions will be better appreci¬ 
ated when, at the close of the present dis¬ 
astrous war, the countries engaged will be 
forced by the international public opinion 
of neutral nations to resort to the Hague 
for the settlement of many of the disputed 
points resulting from the conflict. 


CHAPTER IV 


: Scraps of Paper ’ 


m HERE are many thoughtless, well- 
intentioned, or too-trustful souls who 
believe that peace can be preserved 
by the mere signing of treaties. But how, 
in the face of the absolute disregard of 
“scraps of paper” by practically all the 
nations now engaged in warfare, can any 
sane person accept such twaddle. 

A rather general impression, due in great 
degree to the space devoted to the subject 
by publications of every character, is that 
the only treaties broken during the present 
war were those guaranteeing the neutrality 
of Belgium and Luxemburg, but what of 
the violation of China’s neutrality by the 
Allies? Again the Pekin to Mukden rail- 


16 The Weapon of Peace 

road was made neutral by treaty—has 
Japan respected this solemn pledge? These 
are recent instances of treaty breaking. 
They are typical of what has been done 
innumerable times. In short, since treaty¬ 
making began “scraps of paper' 7 have been 
but frail barriers to the force of arms when 
“military necessity" has made the viola¬ 
tion of the treaties imperative or desirable. 

To get down to cold historical fact, the 
strength of a treaty has been and is only as 
great as the military power of the party 
desiring the keeping of the treaty to pre¬ 
vent others from breaking it; or a lack of 
desire when the other side is the stronger. 


CHAPTER V 


A Firm Foundation 


m HE Hague Conferences of 1899 and 
1907 with the creation of the Per¬ 
manent Court of Arbitration must 
ever stand as the foundation of future 
means of preventing war. However, the 
desired end will not be attained until 
rudimentary legislative machinery is devel¬ 
oped into a real international law-making 
body, and limited judicial power is ex¬ 
panded into a Supreme Court of the World, 
with authority in international affairs 
analogous with the authority of the Su¬ 
preme Court of the United States in the 
municipal affairs of this country. 

To the legislative and judicial must be 
added police power to enforce the decisions 
and the mandates of the court. 


18 The Weapon of Peace 

In principle, these suggestions are not 
new. Until a few months ago they were 
thought too Utopian to command serious 
consideration, but if the war be continued 
for several years or, perhaps, but for a 
year, the nations of Europe will be reduced 
in great measure to the chaotic social and 
political condition of the tribes and races 
of the earth at the dawn of civilization, and 
as the primitive peoples found it necessary 
to begin to devise means to enforce re¬ 
spect for the rights of individuals, so the 
nations of the world will be receptive to 
suggestions looking to justice between 
nations. 

A necessary preliminary to the practical 
application of the plan outlined would be 
the assembling of a commission to compile 
a digest of all rules that tacitly, tentatively 
or positively have been accepted by two or 
more countries as international law. 

In the meantime steps would be taken 


The Weapon of Peace 


19 


in the organization of an International 
Legislature to which the digest of existing 
international law would be presented. 

The legislative body would then be 
charged with the task of making such addi¬ 
tions and revisions as would be found neces¬ 
sary in developing a code of international 
law that would make theoretical inter¬ 
national morality positive international 
morality. 

Next in order would be the organiza¬ 
tion of the Supreme Court of the World. 
This tribunal could be composed of one 
judge from each of the signatory powers. 

That the men comprising this judiciary 
should be of the highest type in character, 
ability and ripe experience goes without 
saying. But would they not be further 
raised above any charge or suspicion of par¬ 
tiality if, upon appointment, they automat¬ 
ically gave up citizenship in their respective 
countries and became, while in office, 


20 


The Weapon of Peace 


citizens of a neutral state—the seat of the 
International Legislature and the Supreme 
Court of the World? Or could not these 
judges become “citizens of the world” by 
their adoption in common by all the Powers 
signatory to the treaty establishing the 
international law-making and judicial 
branches? 

Another means of creating confidence 
in the impartiality of this Court would be 
to remove from the bench during trial the 
judges from the countries whose case was 
being tried. However, it would seem that 
this would be the least desirable of the 
plans suggested, as the viewpoints of the 
litigants would best be understood by 
judges from the countries involved. 

The court procedure would be similar 
to that of a high municipal court. 

Revenue to cover the expenses of the 
International Legislative and the Supreme 
Court of the World would be derived from 


The Weapon of Peace 


21 


fines and taxation of the military establish¬ 
ments of the signatories. Any deficiency 
could be made up by retaining the neces¬ 
sary amount from interest on bonds held 
by the Court. 


CHAPTER VI 


Reserved Rights 

B HILE it would be highly desirable to 
grant a Supreme Court of the World 
the widest jurisdiction, the Powers 
supporting this Tribunal should unquest¬ 
ionably be permitted to reserve to them¬ 
selves certain clearly specified exceptions. 

National honor should not be a judicial 
question. In other words, what is national 
honor in the case of a particular Power 
should not be a matter to be determined 
by any one except the Power itself. But, 
in order that the privilege of reservation 
should not be abused, each Power should 
file with the Court a statement, in detail, 
clearly defining what the Power considered 
national honor. 


The Weapon of Peace 


2 3 


In cases involving national honor, the 
function of the Court should be limited to 
deciding whether the national honor of a 
country, as defined in the memoranda filed 
with the Court, had been violated. 

Other reservations which, in the case of 
the United States, for instance, should be 
made would be matters of domestic affairs, 
immigration restriction, naturalization, 
land ownership by aliens, the Monroe 
Doctrine, the Lodge Resolution, etc. 

It should be strictly optional with the 
country whose internal affairs were in¬ 
volved whether it would or not submit any 
given case to the Court. 

A Power might in the interest of peace, 
while reserving to itself without prejudice 
all rights in the matter, submit to the 
Court cases involving internal matters, 
thereby openly presenting the question to 
the world. 

If, in the opinion of the Court, a nation 


24 


The Weapon oe Peace 


had interfered or was attempting to inter¬ 
fere in the internal affairs of a State, the 
Court could hand down a decision against 
the aggressor and inflict on the culprit 
any punishment within the power of the 
Court. 

Because of the privilege of reservation in 
internal affairs no decision could be made 
against the Power whose internal affairs 
were involved. However, the moral effect 
of failure on the part of a Power to prove 
its case against another would likely serve 
to prevent resort to arms in settlement of 
the question. 

Apparently so many exceptions would 
leave loop-holes for the evasion of the 
jurisdiction of the proposed Court, but 
detailed examination of the causes of war 
will show that while reservations, such as 
these, have sometimes been used as the 
excuse for attack on nations making the 
reservations, such nations on their part 


The Weapon of Peace 


25 


have not, as a rule, attacked others, though 
they have resorted to force of arms in 
defensive warfare to uphold what they con¬ 
sidered measures of self-preservation. 


CHAPTER VII 


The Need of a Weapon 


BE 


IAT some form of police power is 
essential to keeping peace through¬ 
out the world is sound doctrine, but 
that the police power should be in the 
form of an international military force— 
land, naval or both, except for strictly 
defensive purposes—is impracticable. This 
would mean war or threat of warfare. 
What is most desired is means of preventing 
conflict—in fine, a substitute for war. 

Assuming that the causes of most wars 
are economic, any effectual substitute for 
war must inflict on the aggressor the most 
dire financial or other material effects of 
war; it should aim to accomplish the end 
desired in the shortest possible space of 


The Weapon of Peace 


27 


time, and with certainty of result so ob¬ 
vious that the aggressor would see the end 
from the beginning, and be brought to a 
realization of ultimate and inevitable sub¬ 
mission. Yet, there should be no per¬ 
manent economic loss—no lives sacrificed, 
no property destroyed. 

Here we may refer back to our stated 
premise that the civilized peoples of the 
earth desire peace, and we are assuming 
that all are willing to give concrete and 
tangible proof of the sincerity of this desire. 

Further, it is assumed that should a 
peace compact be broken, that signatory 
nations would be willing to make temporary 
financial sacrifices to prevent, or, at least, 
limit the permanent economic loss that 
invariably results from armed conflict. 

As evidence of good faith, each party to 
the peace pact could, in effect, give bond 
to keep the peace. This could be accom¬ 
plished by each paying to the Court an 


28 


The Weapon of Peace 


annual sum, based on the amount of the 
country’s export business, for the pur¬ 
chase, by the Court, of government bonds 
of the signatory Powers; these bonds to 
be held by the Court in trust. The inter¬ 
est on the bonds, except the amount neces¬ 
sary to make up any deficiency in expenses 
as covered in a previous chapter, would be 
paid by the Court to the several countries, 
parties to the peace agreement. 

As a determent to militarism each Power 
would pay to the Court a tax for each war- 
craft, each field gun, each man actively 
engaged in military duty, etc. In the 
case of the men there could be a graded 
tax—increasing somewhat on the principle 
of the Income Tax of the United States— 
with the difference of the basis being the 
number of men under arms in proportion 
to the population of a country. 

So far we have dealt with the voluntary 
actions of Powers—the evidences of good 


The Weapon of Peace 


29 


faith. We now take up the external means 
to prevent the breaking of the peace pact 
and the vindicatory measures to be applied 
to the culprit nation. 

In case of a difference between two 
Powers, either could apply for an injunc¬ 
tion which would be granted immediately 
by the Court. Refusal to obey an injunc¬ 
tion would result in the infliction of the 
extreme powers of the Tribunal. 

The case would as in usual judicial pro¬ 
cedure come before the Court, and by due 
process a decision would be handed down 
specifying a time within which the mandate 
of the Court must be obeyed if the charges 
were sustained. 

If the Court’s orders were disobeyed, 
the disobedient Power would permanently 
lose all title to the bonds held in trust. A 
like effect would follow retaliatory meas¬ 
ures or a declaration of war—formally or 
in effect—by the defendant. 


30 


The Weapon of Peace 


The guilty nation should also be out¬ 
lawed so far as having recourse to the 
Court, or enjoying any of the privileges or 
benefits of the peace pact. 

If more drastic measures became neces¬ 
sary, the Court could declare the culprit 
Power an enemy or civilization and the 
Powers signatory would act as directed by 
the Court. 

Of course, the plaintiff would not be per¬ 
mitted to take the law into its own hands 
after a decision had been rendered against 
the defendant any more than would an 
individual—the plaintiff under civil law— 
take it upon himself to tear down a “spite 
fence” the building and maintaining of 
which had been declared illegal. Hostile 
offensive action initiated by the plaintiff 
would, at the discretion of the Court, make 
the offender liable to any or all of the 
penalties visited upon the defendant. But 
the plaintiff nation would reserve to 


The Weapon of Peace 31 

itself the right of self-defense in case of 
attack. 

In further consideration of measures to 
force obedience to the orders of the Court, 
it hardly seems necessary to suggest that 
traffic in war munitions of any description 
between subjects of nations, parties to 
the peace pact, and a Power under the 
ban of the Court should be absolutely 
prohibited. 

Reversing the universal practice as sanc¬ 
tioned by international law, each nation 
should be made responsible to the Court 
for the actions of the country’s subjects, 
and the nation against which such war 
munitions were used should have recourse 
to the Court in a suit for damages based, 
let us say, on three or more times the value 
of such munitions. 

As a matter of fact, there would be jus¬ 
tice in a claim for the actual damage done 
by the implements of destruction, though 


32 


The Weapon of Peace 


it would be difficult to prove that particular 
munitions did certain damage. 

Notwithstanding that the purpose of 
this volume looks to the reduction of ar¬ 
maments and ultimate disarmament, the 
realization of the ideal is quite as imprac¬ 
ticably idealistic, for the present, as would 
be the disarming of the police and other 
officers of the law or the abolishing of such 
forces. 

However, the use of men and means 
should be strictly limited to defensive 
purposes by the Powers striving to bring 
an outlawed nation to terms, being always 
subject to the orders of the Supreme Court 
of the World on the high seas and every¬ 
where else, except in defensive operations 
on a country’s own soil or within the 
three-mile limit of coast lines. 


CHAPTER VIII 


The Weapon of Peace 

W lITH the commerce of all but the 
belligerent nation, under the protec- 
v.. tion of an international patrol of the 
ocean-trade routes, the Supreme Court 
of the World would next serve final 
notice on the culprit Power to obey the 
mandate of the Court. If no response 
came, or the reply were evasive, the Court 
would then unsheathe “The Weapon of 
Peace ” and strike a death-dealing economic 
blow—to explain the figure of speech— 
declare an International boycott on all 
the exports and imports of the outlawed 
nation. 

Not only would the Powers supporting 
the Court be forbidden to have commercia 




34 


The Weapon of Peace 


or financial relations with the belligerent, 
but all other countries would be notified 
that cargoes consigned to or from ports 
under the ban would be considered contra¬ 
band, and, therefore, subject to capture 
and prize court disposal. 

An alternative method of preventing 
trade between the culprit nation and those 
not in the international agreement would 
be the boycotting of these latter nations for 
violation of the Court’s order. 

The holdings of the outlawed nation or 
of its subjects—real and personal property 
—could be seized as “enemy property” in 
all the countries in the international pact, 
and all income beyond taxes, carrying and 
other expenses, be paid to the Court during 
the continuance of hostilities. 

Merchant ships of the outlawed nation 
could be interned subject to seizure on 
order of the Court. 

No warcraft of the culprit nation should 


A COINCIDENCE 


U lNDER date of January io, 1915, there appeared in 
the Public Ledger, Philadelphia, an article said to 
have been the basis of a series of lectures which the 
late William T. Stead would have delivered in the 
United States had he not met an untimely fate in the 
Titanic disaster. To quote the publication: “this remark¬ 
able document has just come to light through the efforts of 
the Public Ledger. ,, 

By a strange coincidence Mr. Stead’s ideas, in several 
essentials, are similar to those outlined in The Weapon of 
Peace, the manuscript of which was declined by a former 
editor of the Public Ledger, December n, 1914 (one month 
before the publication of Mr. Stead’s article) on the ground 
that the matter was “ too academic.” 

During the month of December, 1914, the manuscript 
of The Weapon of Peace was submitted to the Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, G. 
P. Putnam’s Sons and George H. Doran Co., and was read 
by Mr. Leigh Mitchell Hodges, Henry G. Hodges, A. M., 
and others. 

Excerpts from The Weapon of Peace were published as 
follows: Wilmington, (Del.) Morning News, December 2, 
1914; The Star (Wilmington, Del.) December 13, 1914; 
Chester (Pa.) Times, December 19, 1914. 

Mr. Stead’s posthumous article—appearing in print for 
the first time some weeks after the completion of this 
volume—adds force to the suggestions offered in The 
Weapon of Peace. 

SAMUEL WESLEY LONG. 

January n, 1915. 






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The Weapon of Peace 


35 


be permitted to enter a port of the countries 
enforcing the boycott. Should any such 
vessel attempt to demand supplies, it 
should be made subject to capture or de¬ 
struction by the international patrol fleet. 

Each nation enforcing the boycott should 
use warships—especially light, swift cruis¬ 
ers—to patrol its own coasts to prevent its 
nationals from smuggling goods out of the 
country to the boycotted nation or of 
smuggling into the country from the nation 
under the ban. 

All these coercive measures could be 
further strengthened by a decree of the 
Court setting a date at which hostilities 
must cease under penalty of the period of 
the operation of the boycott being extended 
after the close of war a like number of days 
as the fighting continued after the date set 
by the Court to cease hostilities. 

Were such a plan as the one outlined the 
potential “police power” back of a Su- 


36 The Weapon of Peace 

preme Court of the World, it would mean 
national economic hari-kari for a Power to 
defy the high Tribunal; and what country 
would be so foolhardy in these days of dol¬ 
lar diplomacy when, too often in the high 
places, conscience is carried in the purse? 


CHAPTER IX 


A Two-Edged Sword 

D OW formidable an arm would be 
“The Weapon of Peace” will better 
be appreciated when we examine the 
other edge of this two-edged sword—the 
power of public opinion. 

Answer to yourself the question: What 
is the motive back of the English “White 
Paper,” the German “White Paper,” the 
Russian “ Orange Paper,” the French “Yel¬ 
low Book,” the Belgian “Gray Book”? 

To quote the words of the Hon. Theodore 
E. Burton: “In more than one European 
war of the last century one of the combat¬ 
ants has struggled under the serious handi¬ 
cap of the hostile international opinion 
that the war was not justifiable.” 


38 The Weapon of Peace 


The Duke de Broglie puts it: “We live 
in a time when we must take as much and 
more account of the moral effect of a great 
measure than of its material and immedi¬ 
ate results.” 

Writing at the Hague during the sessions 
of one of the conferences, Baroness von 
Suttner, author of “Lay Down Your 
Arms,” said: “That which impresses me 
most is their respectful obedience to the 
desires of public opinion. If they oppose 
a reform, it is only because they are per¬ 
suaded that public opinion is indifferent 
to it. If public opinion should express 
itself with appropriate vigor, there is noth¬ 
ing the Conference would not try to do. 
The fact is that the delegates are only the 
hands on a watch; their movements are 
governed by a great invisible spring. This 
spring is public opinion; not the private 
opinion of individuals, but public opinion— 
opinion expressed, organized, made pal- 


The Weapon of Peace 


39 


pable and even disagreeable to those who 
oppose it. That is the master, and even 
the god, of the conference.” 

Such recognition of the force of public 
opinion is universal. 

The natural consequence of an adverse 
decision of the Supreme Court of the World 
would be to turn international public opin¬ 
ion against the guilty country. 

If it became necessary to outlaw the 
culprit Power by solemnly declaring it “an 
enemy of civilization,” not only would it 
fail to find sympathy or support abroad, 
but within its own boundaries public 
opinion eventually would be crystallized 
against the government, when the masses 
realized the financial, commercial, political 
and social isolation that had resulted from 
the obstinacy or culpability of those in 
authority. 

Bankers, manufacturers, merchants and 
workingmen would protest and bring to 


40 


The Weapon of Peace 


bear such power as each class possessed to 
influence the government to submit to the 
order of the Court. 

One might easily conceive of this inter¬ 
nal dissatisfaction reaching the proportions 
and menace of rebellion. Instances of this 
character are not lacking, cases in point 
being the threat of a general strike in 
Austria as a protest against that country’s 
suggested participation in the Balkan war; 
another case was the organized opposition 
of the French and German workingmen to 
war between their respective countries 
over the Moroccan controversy. Both in 
French and German cities workers carried 
banners bearing the inscription: “All 
Morocco is not worth the bones of one 
French or German working man.” 

Those who have gone below the surface 
in their investigations of conditions in the 
countries now in the grips of the world’s 
greatest war are of the opinion that dis- 


The Weapon of Peace 41 

sension at home may yet be a factor in a 
principal party seeking means to end the 
titanic conflict in a manner that will save 
the face of those responsible for the nation’s 
part in the war. The reason for this Power 
seeking peace would be comparable to the 
reason for not rushing into war or taking 
means to terminate conflict under pressure 
of the measures outlined in other chapters 
—briefly, the economic effects of isolation. 

How many political heads have been 
lopped off by public opinion—that edge 
so blunt in other days and still dull in some 
parts of the world, but becoming steadily 
keener and keener the longer it remains in 
contact with the slow-moving grindstone 
of experience. 

It is this cutting edge of public opinion 
wielded by the mighty arm of the ever¬ 
growing giant—Democracy—that will one 
day hack the throne from beneath the feet 
of every monarch—be his sceptre kingly or 


42 


The Weapon of Peace 


the invisible one of perverted financial 
power. 

When that day comes wars will be 
fought with economic forces, and the 
ancient pastime of kings, modernized by 
commercial monarchs, will not be played 
with human pawns. 


CHAPTER X 


Peace with Honor and Justice 

NDER such a plan as we have con¬ 
sidered, peace could always be hon¬ 
orable, and the ideal of international 
justice be realized. For the nation 
whose cause had been decided to be just, 
there would be vindication. For the 
Power, whose position had been declared 
to be untenable, to bow to the will of the 
Court would show the nation to be a law- 
abiding member of the Federation of the 
World, and what could be more honorable? 

Where the weak was in the right, it 
would mean peace with justice; where the 
strong’s cause was just, it would mean 
justice with peace. Always would be left 
the middle ground of compromise. 




44 


The Weapon oe Peace 


Treaties would mean in fact what they 
purported to mean, and would be made to 
be kept under all circumstances; not to be 
broken as a matter of advantage or con¬ 
venience. 

Into his own would come the economist- 
statesman with world-vision, devoting his 
best efforts to universal economic justice. 
Then would become extinct the sort of 
“diplomat” whose greatest claim to dis¬ 
tinction is his skill at intrigue and in his 
cunning. 

Realizing the fact that means other and 
more effective than armed clashes would 
determine international questions on their 
merits , the cause of fear would be removed 
and the term “neighbor” would come to 
have a meaning, when applied to nations, as 
truly descriptive of the relationships of 
countries as in the case of individuals of a 
highly-civilized community. 

While the application of the coercive 


The Weapon of Peace 


45 


measures described would impose expense 
on all parties to the compact and possibly 
result in loss to all concerned, the total 
cost would be but temporary and fractional 
in comparison to the permanent and tre¬ 
mendous loss to the entire world resulting 
from warfare. 

Indeed, an examination of the world’s 
balance sheet at the end of a decade in 
which there had been recourse to economic 

POLICE POWER or ECONOMIC WARFARE if 
you please, would show a credit over a 
similar period of armed peace , because of 
the hundreds of millions of saving effected 
by the degree of disarmament that could 
safely be undertaken. 

But even assuming that the net financial 
cost of economic warfare would be as great 
a loss to those co-operating with the Su¬ 
preme Court of the World against a culprit 
nation as that resulting from physical 
conflict, would not the broad view of uni- 


46 The Weapon oe Peace 

versal and mutual responsibility, on the 
principle of one for all and all for one, dic¬ 
tate that the burden of the weak should be 
shared in part by the strong? And would 
there not be satisfaction in the thought 
that the war had been bloodless? 

Deplore as we must the carnival of 
slaughter in which the majority of the world 
Powers are now engaged, might not great 
good result from so monstrous evil? 

Let us hope, and let us use our utmost 
endeavors to have our hope realized, to the 
end that a phase of history repeat itself 
and—as at the close of the Napoleonic Wars 
there was born a desire for peace—so may 
be born again this holy ambition. And 
may peace come, even universal and 

EVERLASTING PEACE. 




















































































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